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The contribution made by this article presents some scopes, approaches 
and results of the transformation of the Slovak Armed Forces within the frame 
of limited defense resources. On the other hand, it confronts the Slovak Armed 
Forces transformation with strategic documents of the Slovak Republic and of the 
Defense Department, namely the Safety Strategy, the Defense Strategy, the Strategic 
Evaluation of Defense and the Complete Evaluation of Defense. The differences 
are compared with Government policy statements and indicate difference between 
theory and reality.    
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Slovak Republic 
foundation, its basic political and 
strategic bounds regarding building 
the defense potential have been deﬁ  ned 
by the defense policy, including the 
development of the Armed Forces with 
the purpose of providing state defense, 
fulﬁ   lling allied and other international 
obligations. A degree of fulﬁ  lling these 
tasks within individual periods of time 
has been directly determined mainly by 
crucial political decisions concerning 
the way and the dynamics of Slovakia’s 
integration process into the North Atlantic 
structures as well as by the level of 
providing resources for the state defense 
and development of the armed forces. 
The defense policy of the Slovak 
Republic has been consistently 
implemented in terms of the Euro-
Atlantic orientation of the Slovak 
Republic since 1999. The main aim 
of the defense policy of the Slovak 
Republic is to guarantee state and 
citizens’ security. Until 2004, this aim 
was fulﬁ  lled by means of a limited 
defense potential of the Slovak 
Republic. Qualitatively speaking, 
the new period of implementing 
the defense policy has begun by the 
accession of the Slovak Republic 
into NATO. Ever since then, the main 
defense aim has been implemented 
under the terms of collective defense. 
On the one hand, the transition from 
individual to collective defense 
represented a substantial increase 
in the security of the inhabitants, as 
well as in the the Slovak Republic 
defensive posture. On the other hand, it also meant a qualitative and 
quantitative increase in the tasks 
for the Armed Forces of the Slovak 
Republic, including an increase in 
their ﬁ  nancial needs. 
The above-mentioned ambitions 
of the Slovak Republic are also 
conﬁ  rmed by the strategic documents 
of the Armed Forces presented below. 
2. STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS 
OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
AND THEIR VIEW ON THE 
ARMED FORCES
“The Security Strategy of the 
Slovak Republic”, declares that 
the main objective of the Slovak 
Republic’s safety policy is to 
guarantee the safety of inhabitants and 
the state in a stable and predictable 
environment. The safety strategy 
considers a safety system consisting 
of foreign, economic, defense, 
internal safety, social, life-saving 
and ecological tools and their mutual 
relations to be a fundamental means 
of the SR safety policy. Foreign 
service as well as the SR Armed 
Forces are stated as traditional tools 
of safety policy [5].
“The Defense Strategy” views 
the Euro-Atlantic orientation to be 
the basic target of its defense policy. 
The NATO and EU membership is 
regarded as a crucial guarantee of its 
safety and defensiveness. It deﬁ  nes 
its basic mission as follows:
in cooperation with allies to protect  - 
the state sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and inviolability of 
frontiers and to protect safety of 
the inhabitants and the state from 
outside threats; 
to fully fulﬁ   ll obligations as a  - 
NATO member;
to fulﬁ   ll obligations as an EU  - 
member within the bounds of 
safety and defense policy. 
In compliance with this mission, 
the defense policy will strengthen the 
defense system so that by 2015 it will 
have been able to fully participate in 
conﬂ  ict prevention and settlement of 
crisis situations in the world within 
the operations of NATO and EU. 
Within the SR Armed Forces reform, 
it will create conditions under which 
the Armed Forces could be fully 
used in operations of high intensity 
for the protection of SR, including 
mobilization and its execution. 
The defense policy considers the 
following points to be strategic tasks 
of the SR Armed Forces:
to protect sovereignty and  - 
territorial integrity of the state, 
inviolability of its frontiers from 
an armed attack, to contribute to 
collective defense of the NATO 
member states;
to protect air inviolability and  - 
to fulﬁ   ll tasks in the system of 
collective protection of the NATO 
common air space;
to maintain the functionality  - 
of a stationary and mobile 
communication and information 
system;
to defend and protect defense  - 
infrastructure while emphasizing 
objects of special importance and 
other important objects; 
to plan and execute mobilization. - 
The capabilities the Armed Forces 
must acquire are adjusted to ﬁ  t these 
tasks – deployment to a wide spectrum 
of operations, speed of deployment and mobility, using information nets, 
efﬁ   cient intelligence, identifying, 
assessing and assigning tasks, 
destructiveness and accuracy of 
strikes, efﬁ   cient engineers support, 
anti-aircraft defense and radiation, 
chemical and biological defense, 
readiness to make use of all 
possibilities of multinational logistics 
and civil-military cooperation. The 
listed capabilities will be a stimulus 
for gradual renovation and increase 
of ﬁ  ghting potential regarding land 
and air forces. The personnel of the 
Armed Forces will be supplemented, 
trained and equipped in compliance 
with the rules used in the NATO 
so that the Armed Forces could 
be included into all categories of 
operational readiness. 
3. GOVERNMENT POLICY 
STATEMENT
In its policy statement for the 
years 1999 – 2002, the strategic 
documents noted above are a follow-
up to government policy statement. 
The government undertook to reform 
the AF, to pursue their modernization, 
to build autonomous deployment 
units and to take measures so as to 
increase quality and intensity of 
military training. The government 
was also due to take measures by 
means of which priority in defense 
industry coordination would be 
given to the Ministry of Defense of 
the Slovak Republic.
The Government Statement of 
Policy for the years 2010 – 2014 [3] 
similarly states that based on the needs 
to ensure the safety of citizens and 
the state defense, taking into account 
the NATO and the EU strategic 
documents, including NATO’s new 
Strategic Concept, the Government 
of the SR will perform a strategic 
evaluation of the SR defense in order 
to deﬁ  ne political and strategic scope 
of long-term development of the 
SR defense and the Armed Forces 
potential, including provision of stable 
resource ambit. Within this process, 
the SR Government will re-evaluate 
basic safety policy and defense 
documents so that they are in line 
with present international relations 
and global safety environment as 
well as with the targets deﬁ  ned in 
most current EU and NATO strategic 
documents. In order to execute the 
process of strategic evaluation of the 
defense, the Government will create 
conditions for a wide dialogue with the 
representatives of expert community, 
as well as with the public in order to 
achieve consensus concerning the 
questions of safety policy and state 
defense, as well as priorities, aims 
and needs of the Armed Forces. The 
conclusions and recommendations of 
the strategic evaluation of the defense 
will be submitted for public debate 
no later then the end of 2012 and 
they will be implemented into basic 
strategic and conceptual documents 
and related legislation.  
The Government of SR will 
ensure continuation of the SR Armed 
Forces transformation in accord with 
conclusions of the strategic evaluation 
of defense and it will also generate 
long-term, stable and appropriate 
resources. Development of human 
potential and the AF modernization 
are considered to be basic pillars of 
transformation.The Government Statement of 
Policy for the years 2012 – 2016 
states:  [4] The Government as a 
guarantor of security for all citizens 
approaches the state defense as one 
of the basic and irreplaceable state 
functions. It will enforce a complex 
approach to complete the formation of 
an integrated safety system at the state 
level and it will also make the defense 
system more effective. At the same 
time, it will consistently lay emphasis 
on economy and transparency when 
drawing resources. In order to make 
activities of the defense department 
more efﬁ   cient, the Government 
will perform rationalization of 
all its organizational structures. 
Within a process of procurement, 
it will make use of mutual projects 
of militarization with other safety 
sectors, as well as with foreign 
partners. The Government will use 
ﬁ  nancial resources obtained this way 
preferentially on the development 
of the Armed Forces of the Slovak 
Republic. It will also re-evaluate 
the level of the Armed Forces of the 
Slovak Republic, their modernization 
and further development, so that that 
they would be able: 
-    to ensure defense of the territory 
and the inhabitants of the SR 
against military, as well as non-
military threats;
-    to ensure that the Slovak Republic 
will take part in international 
operations under NATO, EU and 
UN command.
Even under complex conditions 
of public ﬁ  nances  consolidation, 
further deterioration of the level of 
the AF preparedness and ﬁ  ghting 
capacity is no longer possible. The 
development plan of the defense 
sector, including the Armed Forces 
of the SR with the perspective till 
2024 was envisaged to be ready by 
the end of 2012. The goal of this plan 
is to enable the development of the 
Armed Forces’ capabilities which 
are necessary for handling possible 
future threats and fulﬁ  lling allied and 
other international obligations of the 
SR. The Government will support 
multiannual stability of defense 
expenses following development of 
public ﬁ  nances to get over a long-
term deﬁ  cit in the Armed Forces. 
All these are obligations the 
present, as well as the previous 
Governments bound themselves to 
follow and they are conﬁ  rmed  by 
strategic documents. The evaluation 
documents “Complex Assessment 
of Defense” and mainly “Strategic 
Assessment of Defense” dated 
2012 point out the level of these 
obligations’ implementation. 
3.1. Safety and the Armed Forces 
in the SR Assessment Documents
The document “Complex 
Assessment of Defense for the year 
2012” [2] states that, in comparison 
with 2009, a substantial decrease in the 
limit of expenditure for the Ministry 
of Defense of the Slovak Republic for 
2011 required the implementation of a 
crisis regime within the defense. The 
ratio of operating and development 
expenditure was 85.1 % to 14.9 % 
in a modiﬁ  ed budget. The modiﬁ  ed 
budget for the Armed Forces of the 
Slovak Republic was approximately 
2.8 % (€15.6 mil.) lower that the 
2009modiﬁ  ed budget. Moreover, this limit was 27%, lower than the amount 
required by the Armed Forces. 
This fact negatively inﬂ  uenced  the 
number of personnel within units, 
the training range, the equipment 
needed for operational capability, 
the stockpiles of ammunition, the 
material and spare parts necessary 
for carrying out required repairs. 
The decrease in expenditure for the 
sector of the Ministry of Defense for 
2010 led to a decrease in the number 
of the priorities established by the 
Ministry of Defense in comparison 
with the previous year. Consequently, 
all the original priorities stated in 
the Government Statement of 
Policy for the years 2010 – 2015 
have not been observed. Owing to 
the speciﬁ   ed expenditure limits of 
the SR Armed Forces for 2010, the 
necessities which were ensured 
above all were the requirements of 
the AF servicemen, employees and 
the Ministry of Defense priorities, 
speciﬁ  cally participation of the SR AF 
in international crisis management, 
tasks connected with the protection 
and defense of the airspace within 
the Integrated NATO System of Air 
Defense (NATINADS) and the Air 
Search and Rescue Service (ASRS). 
The decreased limits of expenditure 
for the SR Ministry of Defense 
was translated in the restriction of 
ﬁ  nancial resources intended to cover 
fulﬁ   llment of tasks within a wide 
range of other activities including 
training and the SR AF modernization. 
It also had a negative impact on the 
SR AF development priorities which 
ultimately inﬂ  uenced  fulﬁ  llment  of 
the SR obligations towards the NATO 
and the EU in a negative way. The 
objectives regarding ammunition, 
equipment and material development 
were implemented only partially. In 
terms of factual assessment, out of 29 
projects falling under the subprogram 
of the Ammunition, Equipment 
and Material Development (AEM) 
not a single one was implemented 
in the range it had been planned. 
12 projects met the deﬁ  ned criteria 
of implementation, 7 projects were 
partly implemented, 1 was not 
implemented and 9 projects were not 
executed at all. The process of the SR 
AF armament was radically limited 
by means of allocated ﬁ  nancial 
resources. The amount of €1 056 000 
was approved for the defense research 
and development aimed at the SR 
defense support implemented within 
the subprogram named the Research 
and Development for Defense 
Support. This amount was 75% lower 
than in 2009 and it represented only 
0.0012% of the approved budget of 
the SR AF in 2010. This amount of 
special-purpose support was deeply 
under the level anticipated by the 
Concept of Focusing and Supporting 
Research and Development in the Field 
of Defense for 2010 (€ 4.6 mil.).
“Strategic Assessment of 
Defense”  [1] comments on current 
conditions within the SR AF even 
more critically.
The main objective of the SR 
AF transformation (i.e. to establish 
relatively small, well armed, well 
trained forces disposing of necessary 
military capabilities and prepared 
to carry out a wide spectrum of 
tasks following applicable laws, 
the SR Defense Strategy, decisions 
of state constitutional bodies and international obligations) was not 
fully implemented mainly in the ﬁ  eld 
of modernization and capabilities 
development.  
Elements concerning defense 
management and procurement 
underwent a constant process of 
organizational changes. However, 
these changes were not systematic 
and they were almost never based on 
conceptual intentions. Consequently, 
appropriate level of defense structures 
rationalization and performance 
efﬁ   ciency was not achieved. In 
relation to objective demands of the 
state defense and the Armed Forces, 
the process of transformation, 
rationalization and restructuring has 
not been ﬁ   nished yet. Taking part 
in operations of international crisis 
management is an important tool of 
the SR safety and foreign policy and it 
is also of extraordinary beneﬁ  t to the 
SR international status and credibility. 
However, the units deployed to these 
operations were mostly non-organic, 
consisting of professional soldiers 
from several units. This holds true 
mainly for tasks connected with 
support, engineers and guarding 
because of unavailability of required 
spectrum and quality regarding the 
SR AF capabilities.  These conditions 
cause that contribution concerning 
participation of the SR AF units within 
operations aimed at the development 
of the AF capabilities was exploitable 
in a minimal way. Notwithstanding 
the above and considering the AF 
requirements, current AF structures 
of command and control are 
overlarge, mainly in case of strategic 
and operational level. The process of 
the AF rationalization and increasing 
its performance efﬁ   ciency has not 
been  ﬁ   nished. Current command 
and control system of the Armed 
Forces (including its structure and 
costs) is not in balance with the AF 
performance and tasks fulﬁ  llment 
and it is economically unsustainable. 
Despite the fact a document named 
The Defense Resort Development 
– 2020 Model had an ambition to 
solve these problems, because of 
the unpredictability of its planning 
assumptions it was never completed 
or approved by defense management. 
The document was considered 
unrealistic also from a ﬁ  nancial point 
of view (it presupposed the budget of 
the SR Ministry of Defense to be at 
the level of 1.53% of GDP). In case of 
many states, impacts of the economic 
crisis on public resources have been 
also reﬂ  ected on decreasing defense 
budgets. Almost all the states have 
responded to the crisis by searching 
inner resources and some of them have 
applied processes of defense strategic 
evaluation. And yet there is no direct 
proportion between GDP decrease of 
individual states and their expenses 
on defense. This is conﬁ  rmed by the 
fact that in years 2009 – 2011, in the 
time of the biggest impacts of the 
economic crisis, almost half of the 
NATO states increased the defense 
expenditures share of GDP or they 
left it approximately at the same 
level (a decrease by 0.1% at most). 
In the case of the Slovak Republic it 
is quite the contrary.
These statements can be 
supplemented by statistical 
indicators from crucial areas of the 
AF development (Images 1 – 3, 
charts 1 - 3).Figure 1. The proportion of defense expenditures of GDP in the NATO member 
states in years 2009 - 2011 (%) 
1 – Albania; 2 – Belgium; 3 – Bulgaria; 4 – Canada; 5 – Croatia; 6 – the Czech 
Republic; 7 – Denmark; 8 – Estonia; 9 – France; 10 – Germany; 11 – Greece; 
12 – Hungary;13 – Italy; 14 – Latvia; 15 – Lithuania; 16 – Luxembourg; 17 – the 
Netherlands; 18 – Norway; 19 – Poland, 20 – Portugal; 21 – Romania; 22 – 
Slovakia; 23 – Slovenia; 24 – Spain; 25 – Turkey; 26 – Great Britain;  
27 – the USA, 28 – the NATO (data for 2011 is not available). 
Figure 2. The proportion of defense expenditures of GDP in the new NATO 
member states in countries (in percentage) 2011 (%) 
1 – Albania; 2 – Bulgaria; 3 - Croatia; 4 – The Czech Republic; 5 – Estonia; 6 – 
Hungary (data from 2011 are not available); 7 – Latvia; 8 – Lithuania; 
9 – Poland; 10 – Romania; 11 – Slovakia; 12 – Slovenia; 
13 – NATO (data from 2011 are not available)   Country/Year 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
The Czech Republic 1148 2211 2408 2527 3090 3129 2672
Hungary* 804 1596 1410 1776 1868 1476 1355
Poland 3087 5536 6130 7833 8521 7518 8836
The Slovak Republic // 823 911 1139 1411 1350 1098
* the data do not include non-deployable elements of other forces 
Table no.2 The proportion of expenditures on personnel out of total defense 
expenditures in the V4 
Country/Year 2000–2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
The Czech Republic 45.4 47.4 49.2 51.5 46.1 50.7
Hungary* 48.8 51.2 46.4 48.1 50.4 56.4
Poland 63.3 53.8 54.4 63.2 61.8 56.4
The Slovak Republic // 49.1 51.5 51.7 55.8 64.9
Table no.3 The proportion of expenditures on modernisation out of defense 
expenditures in the V4 countries
Country/Year 2000 – 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
The Czech Republic 18.9 14.6 10.1 12.9 22.4 12.4
Hungary* 11.2 9.0 12.1 14.8 12.7 12.1
Poland 10.9 18.2 18.6 13.9 16.7 18.4
The Slovak Republic // 12.7 16.2 14.6 13.2 9.1
1 – Albania; 2 – Bulgaria; 3 - Croatia; 4 – The Czech Republic; 5 – Estonia; 6 – 
Hungary; 7 – Latvia; 8 – Lithuania; 9 – Poland; 10 – Romania; 11 – Slovakia; 
12 – Slovenia
Figure 3. The proportion of defense expenditures intended for modernisation in the 
new NATO member states in years 2009 – 2010 – 2011 (%)
Table no. 1 Total defense expenditures in USD mil. in the V4 countriesThe long-term non-conformity 
between the given tasks on the one 
hand and real resources allocated to 
their realization on the other hand 
is a crucial problem which has been 
substantially inﬂ  uencing the range and 
quality of the Defense Department’s 
main activities. If the problem is not 
solved, it will deepen. A signiﬁ  cant 
part of the Armed Forces armament 
and equipment is technologically, as 
well as physically obsolete (app. 70% 
of ground equipment is end-of-life, 
out of which tank equipment, infantry 
ﬁ  ghting vehicles - 1, some types of 
armoured personnel carriers, are 
100% end-of life). That has a negative 
impact not only on the achievement of 
required capabilities, level of training 
and quality of fulﬁ  lling the tasks, but 
it also increases the difﬁ  culty of its 
maintenance. Systems and ﬁ  ghting 
sets of Air Forces, as well as essential 
air technology are approaching 
the level of their technical lifetime 
(besides MiG 29 aircraft).  The 
lifetime of some ground, air and 
radio equipment will expire within 
two or ﬁ  ve years. The alarming state 
of some main types of armament and 
technology requires their immediate 
replacement. As a result, there 
have been requirements for sources 
arising within the next ﬁ   ve or ten 
years. The essential prerequisite 
for increase in the Armed Forces 
capabilities and their interoperability 
with allied armies is modiﬁ  cation or 
remilitarization of the main types 
of ground, air and radar technology. 
The assurance of resources to fulﬁ  ll 
this requirement within the budget 
of the Ministry of Defense of the 
Slovak Republic is unreal due to very 
expensive projects which have to be 
implemented on the basis of government 
contracts and long-term timetable for 
repayment signiﬁ  cantly exceeding the 
parliamentary term of one government.  
The Slovak Armed Forces have 
only a limited spectrum of capabilities 
in limited quality. Therefore, a level 
of interoperability within the Armed 
Forces units in comparison with the 
NATO standards (within a 39 - 68 % 
range) is very low and it limits potential 
cooperation of the Armed Forces 
units with allied armies, particularly 
in high intensity operations. The level 
of deployment and sustainability of 
the ground forces is approximately 
33% and 10% against the NATO 
requirements. In the context of the 
aforementioned data, the Slovak 
Armed Forces capabilities will be 
intended to ensure achievement of 
key priorities which include:
–  participation of the Slovak 
Armed Forces in the international 
crisis management operations 
including capability to provide 
contributions for NRF and EU 
BG;
–  fulﬁ   lling the tasks of the 
Slovak air space defense within 
the NATINADS;
– provision of a mechanized 
brigade for collective defense;
– capability to admit coalition 
forces in Slovakia within 
the framework of collective 
defense operation;–maintenance of appropriate 
components in high readiness 
forces (a mechanized battalion 
group).
The proposals concerning the 
future of the Slovak Armed Forces 
has been based on the assessment 
of the security environment, level 
of the acceptable risk compensated 
by the Slovak Republic membership 
in NATO and political guidance in 
order not to change valid political 
and military ambition.
The development strategy of the 
Ministry of Defense will be based 
on the Armed Forces’ strategic 
development enabling to fulﬁ  ll key 
priorities due to the limited range 
of sources. The following risks and 
limitations will be accepted:
–  reduced ability of the 
Slovak Armed Forces to react 
and reduction of available forces 
for the needs of assistance to the 
Slovak Republic citizens in the 
event of natural and industrial 
disasters due to the lack of 
personnel in some Slovak Armed 
Forces military units in peace time 
within the range of 40 – 60% of 
tabular calculations;
–  military and technological 
limitations in implementation 
of international obligations (the 
range of the mechanized brigade 
prescribed capabilities for peace 
structure will be limited. Some 
logistic capabilities will be 
reduced as well. As a result, the 
level of achievement of objectives 
will be decreased).
The Slovak Armed Forces 
sustainable model – will be built 
and developed in order to cover the 
capacities in relation to preparation, 
creation, deployment, maintenance 
and recovery of capabilities to 
provide:
–  continuous protection and 
defense of the Slovak air space 
within the NATO Integrated Air 
Defense System (NATINADS);
–  provision of the Slovak 
Republic’s contribution to 
international crisis management 
operations pursuant to the Slovak 
Republic Security Strategy and 
Defense Strategy;
–  provision of speciﬁ  c  and 
unique military capabilities to 
support public authorities in facing 
non-military crisis situations 
within the Slovak Republic 
territory;
–  provision of mechanized 
brigade within collective defense 
operation;
– admission of coalition forces 
in the Slovak Republic within 
collective defense operations.
The Slovak Armed Forces will 
consist of the following future 
forces:
– forces for immediate combat 
use (high readiness forces) – air 
forces intended to achieve the 
objectives within the NATO 
Integrated Air Defense System 
(NATINADS) and Air Search and 
Rescue Service, ground forces in 
emergency regime of NRF;
– forces to secure capabilities for rapid increase of combat 
potential (lower readiness forces) 
– forces needed for creation and 
provision of mechanized brigade 
for a temporary period, command 
and support structures required for 
achievement of the Armed Forces 
objectives (including speciﬁ  c and 
unique military capabilities to 
support public authorities in facing 
non-military crisis situations);
–  forces based on soldiers in 
reserve with a special contract – 
forces (i.e. military specialists) 
required  to fulﬁ  ll the tasks within 
the support of public authorities 
in facing non-military crisis 
situations in the Slovak Republic 
and within the international crisis 
management;
– forces based on mobilization 
capabilities – forces required 
for the Slovak republic defense 
system to secure defense of 
objects of unique importance 
and other important objects 
in the Slovak Republic and to 
support admission of coalition 
forces within collective defense 
operation in the SR.
In terms of the Slovak Armed 
Forces’ increased efﬁ  ciency,  a 
proposed model represents the 
reinforcement of the Slovak Armed 
Forces’ executive elements (tactical 
units) at the expense of managing and 
supporting elements. This model will 
positively inﬂ   uence the following 
areas:
–  overall capacities of the 
Slovak Armed Forces’ efﬁ  cient 
elements for assistance to citizens 
in the event of natural disasters 
within the Slovak Armed Forces 
will be enhanced (app. 20% 
increase in combat battalion 
capacities);
–  capacities of unique 
capabilities of the Slovak Armed 
Forces intended for assistance to 
citizens in the event of natural 
disasters will be enhanced (creation 
of one engineer company);
–  missing units in order to 
fulﬁ   ll the obligation to provide 
a ground forces brigade will be 
added (artillery units, tactical 
reconnaissance and intelligence);
–  missing units in order to 
fulﬁ   ll other key obligations of 
the Slovak Armed Forces will be 
added (a deployable KIS NATO 
module).
The following tables show the 
estimated calculation of ﬁ  nances for 
modernization of essential types of 
armament, equipment and material 
beyond the range of the Ministry of 
Defense chapter as well as intention 
of reduction of capacities within the 
Defense Department. Commodities Armament, combat equipment 2014 - 2024 
total in Eur 
mil.
Total/commodity 
in Eur mil.
Armoured  
vehicles
Wheeled armoured ﬁ  ghting 
vehicles, light tactical 
multifunctional vehicle in 
various modiﬁ  cations
2 270  2 270 
Air Forces *
Training aircrafts 180 
796 
Multifunctional helicopters 490 
Transport aircrafts 126 
Military  
radar systems
3D radar with close range 18 
224 
3D radar with short range 70 
Surveillance 3D radar with 
middle range
24 
3D radar with middle range 112 
Anti-aerial 
defense 
components
C-RAM, anti-missiles system 2 
10  SHORAD– MEAD – PVO 
with short and middle range 
system
8 
Total 3 300  3 300 
Table no.5: Overall intention of reduction in number 
of Defense Department personnel
Ministry of Defense and its parts
Category Current state Proposed state Reduction
Soldiers 1 060 846 214
Employees 2 833 2 361 472
Total 3 893 3 207 686
Armed Forces
Category Current state Proposed state Reduction
Soldiers 14 745 14 451 294
Employees 4 451 4 049 402
Total 19 196 18 500 696
Defense Department
Category Current state Proposed state Reduction
Soldiers 15 805 15 297 508
Employees 7 284 6 410 874
Total 23 089 21 707 1382*
Table no. 4: Finances required for technology modernizationHowever, according to the strategic 
defense assessment the capabilities 
of the Armed Forces in comparison 
with the NATO member states reach 
approximately 50%. The Defense 
Department budget for the year 2013 
totals 50 mil. EUR, which is less 
than the 2012 budget. Moreover, the 
strategic defense assessment also 
includes the obligation to defend 
critical infrastructure objectives and 
objects of particular importance. 
However, the proposal to reduce 
forces asks for the cancellation 
of what is considered as the most 
efﬁ  cient element PLRK S – 300PMU, 
capable to defend the aforementioned 
objects against air terrorism. 
The declared increase in 
capabilities has been reﬂ  ected  in 
practice: with the modernization of 
technology, armament and training 
within the NATO we have reached 
the bottom. Human development 
as well as the modernization of the 
Armed Forces are referred to as 
the pillars of transformation in the 
Government Statements of Policy. 
However, practice contradicts this. 
The Government, by the statements 
it made, pledged to strengthen the 
participation of the Armed Forces in 
solving crisis situations. However, the 
amended Regulation of the Ministry 
of Defense No. 1/2012 establishing 
the extent of a commander’s power 
scope in the event of decision making 
on immediate deployment of soldiers 
and necessary logistic support 
actually decreases it (in comparison 
with the Regulation of the Ministry of 
Defense No. 38/2009). Furthermore, 
A set of rationalisation 
measurements will be implemented 
in order to gain resources for 
development of the Slovak Armed 
Forces sustainable model. These 
measurements will be focused on 
reduction of the Slovak Armed 
Forces expenses and strengthening 
their efﬁ  ciency.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The prosperity and growth of 
living standards have never been so 
dependent on the citizens and state 
security level in comparison with 
the current economically linked 
and rapidly changing world. This 
dependence will develop further 
due to the growth of uncertainty 
and unpredictability of the security 
environment (e.g. current turbulent 
and unpredictable development of 
situation in North Africa or Middle 
East).
With respect to a critical state 
in the Defense Department and 
Slovak Armed Forces, the level of 
country defense and achievement of 
international obligations requires the 
adoption of timely measurements in 
relation to further transformation of 
the Slovak Armed Forces.
When comparing strategic and 
assessment documents it is obvious 
that they signiﬁ   cantly differ in 
the commitments they make, on 
one hand, and the security policy 
implementation, on the other hand. 
As a result of the defense strategy, 
the Armed Forces are obliged to 
contribute to collective defense. the proposed calculation of ﬁ  nances 
to the amount of 3.3 billion EUR 
may be regarded as utopia. 
From this point of view, the 
aforementioned documents may 
be regarded unreal and therefore 
they must be reviewed and revised 
as soon as possible. After that, a 
comprehensive material including a 
model of the way the Armed Forces 
and other parts of the Defense 
Department are to be reformed, as 
well as a proposal concerning the 
method and time schedule for the 
reform measures to be implemented 
can be drawn up and submitted for 
approval to the Slovak government. 
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